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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides an assessment of the effects of the main trade agreements implemented in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a gravity model for a panel of 14 
countries (7 South Mediterranean, 4 EU member states in addition to USA and Japan) for the time span 
1991 till 2012. The trade agreements of interest are the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA), the 
Agadir Agreement and the Association Agreements (AAs) signed between the EU and the South 
Mediterranean countries (SMCs) and are considered the main building blocks for the Euro-Med Free 
Trade Area.  
Results show a positive and significant effect of both the PAFTA and the Agadir Agreement on the 
exports of their signatories. Differently, signing the AAs seems to have no significant impact on the 
exports of the countries on average as well as the exports of the majority of the SMCs in specific. 
However, there is a positive and significant impact of the AAs on the exports of the EU member states. 
When analyzing the behavior of the single countries, emerges a positive impact of PAFTA on the exports 
of Egypt and Morocco, a negative impact on Tunisia and insignificant impact on Algeria and Jordan. The 
Agadir Agreement benefited both Egypt and Morocco, leaving no significant effects on both Tunisia and 
Jordan. Finally, signing the AAs had a positive impact on Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, a negative impact 
on Algeria and Jordan, and insignificant impact on the exports of both Israel and Tunisia. These results 
imply the success of the intra-regional integration efforts, unlike the outcome of the inter-regional AAs. 
The current design of the AAs seems to have asymmetric outcome on its signatories. The persistence of 
this problem can hinder the path towards a mutually beneficial and fully fledged Euro-Med Free Trade 
Area.  
 
 
JEL Keywords:  Empirical Studies of Trade, Economic Integration 
JEL Codes:   F14, F15  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Working towards the creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic 
prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-
Mediterranean region” those were the goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration, the mission 
statement of the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Med Partnership, launched in 1995.  
These ambitious words were soon translated into actions. The EU initiated a grid of bilateral 
Association Agreements (AAs) to be signed with the South Mediterranean countries (SMCs) to 
facilitate the creation of a Euro-Med Free Trade Area. To guarantee the creation of a fully 
fledged free trade area, the Barcelona Process recognized two main levels of economic 
integration in the region: First, an inter-regional or North-South economic integration process 
and second, an intra-regional or South-South level of economic integration. If trade wasn‟t 
liberalized among the SMCs themselves, the AAs would never succeed in creating the esteemed 
free trade area singlehandedly. Therefore, the EU started to sponsor any initiative that could help 
in boasting the flow of trade among the SMCs themselves.  
In other words, the creation of a Euro-Med Free Trade Area required two categories of bilateral 
and multilateral regional trade agreements reflecting the two main pillars for the economic 
integration process: The North-South and the South-South pillars.  
The aim of this research is to assess the effects of the AAs on the exports of the signatory 
countries as well as the effects of signing the agreement creating the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 
(PAFTA) and the Agadir Agreement. In this paper, the AAs serve as proxy for the North-South 
pillar and the PAFTA and Agadir Agreement as proxies for the complementary but necessary 
South-South pillar. The empirical analysis relies on a gravity model for a panel of 14 countries 
representing both shores of the Mediterranean from 1991 till 2012.  
As for the contribution made by this research to the existing literature about the Euro-Med 
economic integration process, it is two-fold: i) extending the evaluation span till the year 2012 
and ii) using this updated dataset to evaluate the effects of the three trade agreements from 
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different perspectives (on average, for the SMCs, for the EU states and for the single SMCs). 
The multi-perspective analysis using an up to date dataset as well as different estimation 
techniques for robustness is considered the main innovation of this paper allowing a profound 
and comprehensive analysis for the economic integration process in the region.   
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of the three 
trade agreements followed by a descriptive analysis for the inter- and intra-regional trade. 
Chapter 2 reviews previous studies that discussed economic integration in the region focusing on 
the impact of implementing the three trade agreements of interest. Then, a discussion of the data, 
methodology and results is provided in chapter 3 followed by, finally, the conclusions and some 
policy implications of the results reported in this paper  
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CHAPTER 1 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
REGION 
 
1.1  A Historic Overview 
Before evaluating the impact of any trade agreement, one should understand the environment in 
which it is implemented. Therefore, this section will provide a brief historic overview of the 
economic integration process in the region. This overview will cover both pillars. First, a brief 
description of both the PAFTA and Agadir Agreement will be provided. These agreements are 
considered main milestones for the intra-regional or the South-South level of economic 
integration. Then, I will move to the second pillar, the inter-regional or the North-South level of 
economic integration. This pillar is mainly built on the Association Agreements signed by the 
EU and the SMCs on bilateral bases. The AAs serve as crucial tools of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership.  
 
The Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA)
1
 
Trade integration among the Arab states is an old story that dates back to the creation of the Arab 
League in 1945. Promoting political and economic integration has always been on the agenda. 
Several attempts have been made since the 1950s whether in the form of treaties, conventions or 
multilateral agreements. All suffered from lack of political will behind them to guarantee their 
implementation. As a result, trade barriers remained high between the Arab States, forming all 
sorts of obstacles on the road for economic integration in the Arab world. The 1990s witnessed 
some changes when some of the Arab states became members in the WTO and started to 
implement trade liberalization measures on multilateral, bilateral and regional bases. A wide 
network of bilateral agreements some of the Arab states facilitated the birth of more multilateral 
                                                          
1
 Previously known as the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) 
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and regional agreements in the Arab world. “Among these numerous agreements which very 
often overlap each other in spaghetti regionalism, GAFTA is certainly the most far-reaching one. 
This is due not only because it covers all countries in the Arab region, but also because it relies 
on political institutions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League. Moreover, 
the contents of the agreement are also far-reaching, first because it not only includes the removal 
of tariffs, but also monetary, administrative and quantitative NTBs (i.e. quotas). It also provides 
for the trade liberalization in agriculture (despite a transition period) as well as a precise set out 
of rules of origins” (Abedini and Peridy, 2008:851). More than 15 years after signing the 
Agreement on Facilitation and Development of Trade Among Arab States in 1981 by the 
members of the Arab League and to enhance its implementation, the member states signed an 
agreement to help create a Pan-Arab Free Trade Area in 1997 to be completed within 10 years. It 
came into force in January 1998. Later, the Arab Summit held in Beirut in March 2002 and the 
Economic and Social Council meeting held in September 2002 decided to reduce the transitional 
period for the implementation of the PAFTA to be seven years ending in January 2005. It was 
originally signed by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Currently Algeria 
and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are also members of the 
PAFTA.  
 
The Agadir Agreement 
The "Agadir Declaration" was signed by Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in the Moroccan 
city of Agadir on 5 August 2001 for the establishment of a free trade area for the Arab 
Mediterranean countries. The four countries signed in Rabat on 25 February 2004 the agreement 
on the establishment of the free trade area between the four countries. It entered into force in 1 
January 2007. Upon the acceptance of the signatories, other states can join: members of the 
PAFTA that signed an Association Agreement or a FTA with the EU. In addition to establishing 
a free trade area among its members, the Agadir Agreement aims at developing economic and 
commercial cooperation as well as encouraging economic and industrial integration among 
member countries by applying the cumulative rules of origin for goods produced for export to 
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the EU as well as to their domestic markets. The harmonization of the implemented rules of 
origin under the Agadir Agreement with those required by the Association Agreements, namely 
the Pan-Euro-Med Rules of Origin, signed between the EU and the SMCs is a crucial 
contribution to a fully fledged Euro-Mediterranean economically integrated region. In other 
words, the Agadir Agreement not only enhances the flow of trade between its southern 
Mediterranean members but also boasts the trade with the EU. In that sense, the Agadir 
Agreement, as part of the South-South economic integration pillar, is also supporting the North-
South pillar.  
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
2
 
A turning point in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is the Barcelona Process launched in 
November 1995 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the then, 15 EU members and 12 
Mediterranean partners, as the framework to manage both bilateral and regional relations. 
Guided by the agreements of the Barcelona Declaration, it formed the basis of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership which has expanded and evolved into the Union for the 
Mediterranean
3
. It was an innovative alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, 
dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and 
shared prosperity. The partnership was organized into three main dimensions, which remain till 
today as the broad working areas of the partnership: 
1) Political and Security Dialogue, aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability 
underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
2) Economic and Financial Partnership, including the gradual establishment of a free-trade area 
aimed at promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-
economic development. 
                                                          
2
 This section is based on the information available on the websites of the European commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership), the European 
Union External Action (http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm) and the Union for the Mediterranean 
(www.ufmsecretariat.org) 
3
 The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit as a continuation of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med), also known as the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995. 
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3) Social, Cultural and Human Partnership, aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural 
dialogue between cultures, religions and people, and facilitating exchanges between civil 
society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people.  
In 2005, the Barcelona Summit agreed on a five-year work program and a Euro-Mediterranean 
Code of Conduct for Countering Terrorism, as well as adding migration as a fourth key pillar of 
the partnership. 
Under the umbrella of each sector, Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meetings have been held in 
order to establish the political commitments which drive cooperation and activity across sectors. 
These meetings are punctuated by periodic meetings of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs which take stock of the partnership, its priorities and the progress made on different 
initiatives.  With the introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the 
Barcelona Process essentially became the multilateral forum of dialogue and cooperation 
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners while complementary bilateral relations are 
managed mainly under the ENP and through Association Agreements signed with each partner 
country. 
This paper is focusing on the second pillar of the Barcelona Process, which is centered around 
the creation of a deep Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area,  removing barriers to trade and 
investment between both the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries (Inter-regional or North-
South economic integration)  and between the Southern Mediterranean countries themselves 
(Intra-regional or South-South economic integration). The North-South level is based on a 
network of bilateral Association Agreements
4
 signed between the EU and the Mediterranean 
countries individually. The scope of these AAs is essentially limited to trade in goods and a 
number of bilateral negotiations still on-going or being prepared in order to deepen these 
agreements. These ongoing or future negotiations are related to further liberalization of trade in 
agriculture, liberalization of trade in services, accreditation and acceptance of industrial products 
and regulatory convergence. As for deepening the South-South economic integration, a key goal 
of the Euro-Mediterranean trade partnership, the EU supports the strengthening of trade relations 
amongst Southern Mediterranean countries such as the Agadir Agreement and various bilateral 
                                                          
4
 With the exception of Turkey which signed a custom union and not an association agreement.  
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agreements between the Mediterranean countries themselves (i.e. Israel and Jordan, Turkey and 
Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Morocco individually). 
Bensassi et al. (2010) provides a detailed description of the innovations introduced by those 
AAs. A distinction between direct and indirect effects of those agreements is useful at this point. 
According to Bensassi et al. (2010) direct effects are those resulting from an increase in the 
openness of the EU markets to Mediterranean products, where as the indirect effects are those 
resulting from the growth of the Mediterranean openness to EU products. Starting with the direct 
effects, Mediterranean industrial products were allowed to enter the EU markets free of custom 
duties since 1978. So theoretically products from the Mediterranean countries have been able to 
enter the EU markets for decades now, but in practice the question of determining the origin of 
the product can constitute a major obstacle in front of those theoretical open borders. The main 
innovation in that matter is the changes made by the Barcelona Process regarding the 
implemented Rules of Origin (RoO) compared to those used since 1978. The Pan-Euro-Med 
Rules of Origin now allow for diagonal cumulation in addition to the already implemented 
bilateral cumulation methodology. Bilateral cumulation means that two countries linked by an 
agreement can use without any limits materials coming from each other. Diagonal cumulation 
means that materials originated from a third country also linked by an agreement to one of the 
signing country could be used without any limits by the other signing country. For example if 
Germany and Morocco have signed a FTA and at the same time Morocco and Tunisia have 
signed a FTA that allows diagonal cumulation, any intermediate products used by Morocco 
originated from Tunisia are considered Moroccan when the final product enters Germany. This 
new rule doesn‟t only mean an expansion of the use of intermediate goods from a wider range of 
EU-Med members, but also with the Agadir Agreement implementing the same methodology, an 
even wider range of more efficient intermediate goods is now available for use. Consequently, 
the Mediterranean exports to the EU markets should increase. Moving to the indirect effects of 
the Barcelona Process which result in the increase of openness of the Mediterranean markets to 
EU products, for the first time the Mediterranean markets are now open to the EU products at the 
same level of the EU openness to Mediterranean goods. This reciprocal principle is the main 
change brought by the Barcelona Process. This innovation has two main consequences: First, an 
increase of Mediterranean imports originated it the EU. Second, the implementation of the 
diagonal cumulation methodology can increase the use of less expensive intermediate goods 
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from the EU in the production of Mediterranean final products. This might lead to cheaper 
Mediterranean exports flowing back to the EU. In that sense, this might also lead to an increase 
of the Mediterranean exports to the EU markets.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Trade Balance 
  
Figure 1.1 shows how the final impact on the trade balance of the Mediterranean countries 
depends on the relative strength of both streams. If the less developed Mediterranean countries 
didn‟t succeed in exploiting the benefits of the Pan-Euro-Med rules of origin, the benefits from 
the Barcelona Process would only be harvested by the already more developed EU countries. 
And the Barcelona Process would fail in creating the ambitious region of shared prosperity it was 
set out to achieve. This is a matter that will be further discussed and empirically investigated in 
chapter 3 with more details.  
 
1.2 A Descriptive Analysis 
This section will try to paint a picture of the trade profile of the Euro-Mediterranean region. The 
descriptive analysis provided in this section aims at clarifying the relative importance of the 
South Mediterranean countries and the European Union as trade partners for each others. To do 
that a series of figures are generated based on export and import data from the United Nations 
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COMTRADE database for the EU27 as well as the aggregates of 10 South Mediterranean 
Countries
5
 for the period from 2000 till 2012. This time period witnessed the effective 
implementation of the trade agreements of interest, namely the PAFTA, the Agadir Agreement 
and the EU Association Agreements.  
 
The EU perspective 
Despite the proximity of the SMCs to the European Union and the shared colonial history of the 
North African countries as French and British colonies, it can be argued that the current level of 
trade between the northern and southern Mediterranean is insignificant. Of course, that argument 
is only true when regarded from the European perspective.  Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 show the 
level of exports to and imports from the SMCs in comparison to the EU total trade.  
Figure 1.2: EU27 exports to SMCs vs. World 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
As shown in Figure 1.2, the total EU27 exports have been steadily increasing throughout the past 
decade except for a sharp drop in 2009, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, and going 
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 The countries that represent the SMC group in this section are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Syria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.  
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back to the steadily increasing trend.  When comparing to the trend and size of the exports to the 
SMCs, two observations are relevant: First, the relative size of exports to the SMCs in 
comparison to the total EU exports is significantly small. Second, the changes in exports to the 
SMCs follow the same overall behavior of exports to the world, namely the steady increase. 
Which might be an indicator that the increasing exporting power of the EU to the SMC is not a 
special phenomenon, driven by the special effects of implementing the Association Agreements 
for example or by any Euro-Med specific trade policy, but rather just the reflection of the overall 
success of the EU in boasting its exports to the world. When comparing the percentage changes 
in both exports to the SMCs and exports to the world, two key issues must be mentioned: Till the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the YoY percentage changes in the exports to the SMCs 
are higher than the overall YoY percentage changes in the amount of exports to the world (i.e. in 
2003: 22% and 16%, in 2004: 30% and 20% for exports to the SMCs and to the world 
respectively). But this trend was interrupted by the common fall in exports in 2009 to both the 
SMCs and to the world by 17%. The recovery in the exports to the SMCs after the crisis is 
significantly slower than the recovery in the overall exports to the world. For example, in 2011 
and after the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis, exports to the world increased by 8% where 
as exports to the SMCs increased only by 2%.  
Figure 1.3: EU27 imports from SMCs vs. World 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
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As for the behavior of imports from the SMCs in comparison to the overall imports of the EU27 
from the world, the same observations stated about Figure 1.1 and the behavior of exports are 
also valid here. The relative size of imports from the SMCs is again extremely insignificant in 
comparison to the overall size of imports from the world as well as the echoing pattern of change 
in both of them. The only novelty here would be that in 2009 imports from the SMCs suffered 
from a stronger fall (28%) than the fall in overall imports from the world (25%). Moreover, soon 
after a barely noticeable recovery from the impact of the Global Financial Crisis, the sovereign 
debt crisis took a stronger toll on the imports from the SMCs compared to the level of imports 
maintained with the rest of the world, a YoY increase of 3% compared to 17% respectively in 
2011.  
Figure 1.4: The relative weight of the SMCs among EU27 trade partners 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
Figure 1.4 shows the EU27 exports to and imports from the SMCs as a percentage from the total 
level of exports to and imports from the world. In general, trade with the SMCs constitutes no 
more than roughly 10% or less of the EU27 total trade. Worth mentioning though is that the 
relative importance of the SMCs as export destination is greater than its importance as a source 
of imports to the EU. This explains the behavior of the EU27 trade balance with the SMCs 
shown in Figure 1.5. In general, the EU enjoys a trade surplus with the SMCs, except for a brief 
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phase right before the Global Financial Crisis, with a temporary and exceptional boom in both 
exports to and imports from the SMCs.  
Figure 1.5: EU27 trade balance with SMCs 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
To summarize, the SMCs cannot be considered a key trading partner for the European Union. 
But it seems like, despite their relative weight in the EU trade profile, the net impact of these 
weak trade ties seem to be in favor of the European side of the Mediterranean.  
 
The South Mediterranean perspective  
The South and East Mediterranean Arab states share many characteristics that should grease the 
wheel of intra-regional trade. In addition to proximity, common language and culture are great 
advantages that should lead to a high level of economic integration among them. This is in 
theory, but in practice, many studies show that the actual level of trade among the Arab states is 
way below its potential. Many studies work on exploring the reasons behind the missing trade 
between the Arab states, among which are the SMCs of interest in this paper. For example, Al 
Atrash and Youssef (2000) suggest that the intra-Arab trade and the Arab trade with the rest of 
the world are below what is predicted by the gravity equation. Having that said, the scope of this 
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section is to compare this already “too little” level of intra-regional trade with the SMCs trade 
with the EU, or what is referred to in this paper as the inter-regional trade.  
Figure 1.6: Intra- vs. inter-regional trade 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
Figure 1.6 shows a comparison between the level of exports and imports taking place among the 
SMCs themselves and the level of exports to and imports from the EU27. The first observation is 
the intra-regional trade plays a greater role for exports, where as the EU serves as a more 
important source of imports for the SMCs. Figure 1.6 shows the level and trend of the SMCs 
exports among themselves as well as to the European Union. The trends of both export 
destinations are more or less consistent but exhibiting a greater percentage fall in inter-regional 
exports in the aftermath of the crisis in 2009 in comparison to the fall in intra-regional exports, 
28% and 25% respectively. The years 2007 and 2008 witnessed a boom in intra-regional exports 
(30% and 28%) in comparison to the YoY percentage changes in the inter-regional exports for 
the same years (15% and 17%). This could be the reflection of the implementation of the Agadir 
Agreement and a decent post-implementation time span for the PAFTA. True that the same 
period also covers the implementation of most of the AAs signed with the EU, but the percentage 
changes in the exports to the EU27 are strictly consistent with the overall percentages for the 
SMCs exports to the world. In other words, the trend of the exports to the EU is consistent with 
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the average trend of the SMCs exports to the world, where as the trend of the intra-regional 
exports shows an above average performance.    
Moving to the SMCs‟ imports, Figure 1.6 shows that imports from the EU exceed greatly the 
level of imports from the SMCs themselves. In general, the trends for both sources of imports are 
consistent  The YoY percentage changes in imports from the EU27 always outperformed those 
from the other SMCs, except for a brief period around the Global Financial Crisis, when inter-
regional imports dropped at a sharper rate than the intra-regional levels and recovered at a slower 
rate. By 2010 and despite the presence of the sovereign debt crisis, imports from the EU have 
regained their lead.  
Figure 1.7: The relative weight of the EU27 among the SMCs trade partners 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
An important issue that must be covered now is the importance of the European Union as a trade 
partner to the SMCs. Unlike what was mentioned earlier about the extremely small weight of the 
SMCs as trading partners to the EU, the story is totally different from the Mediterranean 
perspective. In the early 2000s, almost 60% of SMCs exports were shipped to the EU and around 
50% of their imports are European goods. Later on, despite the fluctuations of the shares of 
exports and imports, a general decline in the role played by the EU both as export destination as 
well as source of imports is evident. By the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, the share 
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of the European goods flowing to the SMCs dropped to 40% of total SMCs‟ imports and to 50% 
of total SMCs‟ exports.  
Figure 1.8: SMCs total trade 
 
Source: COMTRADE Database  
Still form the Mediterranean perspective, Figure 1.8 shows a comparison between the levels of 
SMCs total trade (exports plus imports) among themselves, with the EU and with the world. 
Inter-regional trade played a greater role till the mid 2000s, when it was overtaken by the 
increasing levels of intra-regional trade. This could be due to many factors, one of which could 
be the implementation of some intra-regional trade agreements such the Agadir Agreement and 
other bilateral agreements between the SMCs. This could imply a successful South-South 
economic integration process. Another explanation could be the failure of the North-South 
economic integration process. What could be seen as a success story for the intra-regional efforts 
could also be interpreted as the results of the failure of the North-South efforts. In other words, 
this phenomenon could tell either a story about an exceptional performance by SMCs trading 
with each other or a story about the failure of the Euro-Med process in catching up with steady 
and normal growth of the trade trends in the region.  
To summarize, from the perspective of the Mediterranean countries, the EU is a major trade 
partner. It plays a greater role as a source of imports than it serves as a market for the SMCs 
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exports. Over the years, its role has been diminishing, although it is still considered the major 
trading partner for the SMCs. Whether this decline in importance is due to a failure of the North-
South economic integration process or simply the result of the exceptional performance of other 
trading partners, such as other SMCs, USA or China, this is the question that will be further 
investigated in chapter 3 using empirical tools.     
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter will survey previous literature evaluating the impact of regional trade agreements in 
the Euro-Mediterranean context. All the work reviewed in the following sections is based on 
gravity models. Gravity models have been extensively used in international trade for the last 40 
years because of their considerable robustness and explanatory power. Since their introduction in 
the 1960‟s, gravity models have been used for assessing trade policy implications and, 
particularly recently, for analyzing the effects of Free Trade Agreements on international trade 
(Kepaptsoglou et al, 2010:1). The concept of the gravity model is based on the Newtonian 
physics since it explains bilateral trade flows based on size and proximity of both origin and 
destination countries as well as other characteristics of specific importance. The following 
equation shows Newton‟s law of the gravitational force which is directly proportional to the 
masses of both objects (Mi and Mj) and indirectly proportional to the distance between them (Dij) 
 
𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑗 =  
𝑀𝑖𝑀𝑗
𝐷𝑖𝑗
  , where j ≠ j 
 
The above equation has to be transformed to its natural logarithmic form for estimation. When 
applied in international trade, the gravitational force becomes the bilateral trade flow (i.e. 
exports, imports, exports as percentage of GDP, imports as percentage of GDP, etc.) and the 
mass is usually proxied by the GDPs of reporter and partner countries, their GDPs and their 
populations, their GDPs and their per capita GDPs or just their per capita GDPs.  
 
𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑗 = 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑖 +  𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑖 −  𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗   , where j ≠ j 
 
In addition to mass and distance, which are considered the standard gravity variables, dummies 
for trade policy tools (i.e. trade agreements) or other institutional variables (i.e. currency union) 
can be added.  
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Despite the lack of a specific theoretical background behind the gravity model in international 
trade, its robust empirical results make the use of it an excellent tool in practical applications. To 
bridge the gap between theory and practice in order for the gravity model not to be characterized 
as “facts without theory”, various works have provided microfoundation to the gravity equation 
such as Anderson and van Wincoop (2001). To solve the “border puzzle” they derived the 
gravity equation taking the theory behind it more seriously. The building blocks of their gravity 
model are: First, all goods are differentiated by origin where each region is specialized in one 
product and that its supply is fixed. Second, identical and homothetic preferences approximated 
by a CES utility function. The resulting microfounded gravity equation tells that bilateral trade, 
after controlling for size, depends on the bilateral trade barrier between regions i and j divided by 
the product of their multilateral trade resistance.  
 
As mentioned before, the economic integration process in the region is built on two pillars: 
North-South (Inter-regional) and South-South (Intra-regional). The following sections will 
discuss the recent previous literature evaluating the effect of the various trade agreements in the 
region serving both pillars.  
 
2.1 Evidence of the Inter-regional Integration 
The Inter-regional integration effort is proxied in this paper by the Association Agreements 
signed by the South Mediterranean Countries, individually, and the EU as partner. The AAs form 
a grid of bilateral agreements with the aim of establishing a free trade area among all parties at 
the end. The AAs were signed and implemented at different times depending on the negotiating 
SMC. But in general they came in force starting from the late 90s till the early years of the 21
st
 
century. Given the relatively recent implementation of the AAs, the empirical work that focuses 
on estimating their impact on trade flow in the region is very few. Table 2.1 shows a summary of 
the main empirical work reviewed in this section.  
  
19 
 
Table 2.1: Inter-regional integration (North-South pillar) 
Author(s) Sample Methodology Findings 
Ruiz and 
Villarubia 
(2007) 
102 countries 
over the 1976-
2005 period 
Gravity model using 
country-year fixed effects in 
order to control for 
multilateral resistance terms 
Only country fixed-effects: 
negative impact of the EU-Med 
AAs on the trade flow: some 
evidence of  trade creation between 
members and non-members 
Country-year fixed-effects: non-
significant impact of these 
agreements on members 
Hagemejer and 
Ciselik (2009) 
7 MENA 
countries plus 196 
partner countries  
over the period 
1980-2004 
Gravity model includes 
individual and country-pair 
fixed-effects as well as 
GDP per capita as proxy for 
capital/labor ratios in 
partner countries (account 
for factor proportions) 
The EU-Med AAs increased the 
trade flow from the EU to the 
Mediterranean partners, but had no 
significant or even negative impact 
on the flows in the opposite 
direction.  
Bensassi et al. 
(2010) 
7 MENA and 4 
EU countries over 
the 1995-2007 
period  
Sector-level gravity 
equations for exports from 
MENA to EU countries 
distinguishing between the 
effects on the intensive 
(values)  and extensive 
(numbers) margins of trade 
A positive impact of the EU-Med 
FTAs on the exports of the 
Mediterranean countries through 
the increase in the intensive 
margin. 
 
Ruiz and Villarubia (2007) estimate a gravity equation with country-year fixed effects to control 
for the multilateral trade resistance term for a sample of 102 countries (including the Euro-Med 
countries) from 1976 to 2005. Since the main focus of their paper is the proper use of dummies 
in estimating gravity equations, they run the model once with time-constant fixed effects and 
then with time-varying fixed effects. The interesting finding is that the coefficients of interest – 
the membership in a Euro-Med association agreement – are negative in the time-constant 
specification and insignificant in the more robust time-varying fixed effects specification. Yet 
the insignificant role of the AAs reported in their study should be handled with caution due to the 
relatively short post-implementation time span of their sample.  
Hagemejer and Ciselik (2009) used the augmented gravity equation for seven MENA countries 
and 196 of their partner countries from 1980 to 2004. In their paper they used a generalized 
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gravity equation that can be derived from a variety of neoclassical and new trade theory models 
that included in addition to the AAs dummies for other muultilateral and bilateral free trade 
agreements concluded by the MENA countries among themselves as well as with countries from 
outside the region. They studied the impact of signing the AAs on both imports and exports of 
particular MENA countries as well as of the whole group. Their results show that the AAs 
contributed to a significant increase of the imports of the MENA countries from the EU but 
didn‟t lead to any expansion of the MENA exports to EU markets. The impact on the particular 
MENA countries differs greatly across the different countries of the region.  
As for Bensassi et al. (2010), they follow a less common analysis. They estimate a structural 
gravity equation using highly disaggregated data for exports from seven MENA countries to the 
four biggest continental European economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) from 1995 till 
2007. The objective is to estimate the impact of signing the AAs on both the intensive and 
extensive margins of trade. Intensive margin of trade refers to the mean value of individual 
shipments whereas the extensive margin of trade refers to the number of exporting firms. Results 
show a positive and significant effect of the AAs on the MENA exports in total. This increase in 
the trade flow is driven by a 43% the extensive margin of trade, which reflects a variety of traded 
products.  The remaining 57% is driven by the intensive margin of trade or in other terms the 
average value of the traded shipments. The positive impact on MENA exports is considered a 
rare finding in the literature. Therefore, these results should be regarded with caution due to the 
high risk of omitted variables both from the sampled countries as well as the selected sectors. It 
is also worth mentioning that this paper, unlike the previous and later reviewed ones, is not using 
aggregates for the trade flows, but is focusing on highly disaggregated data. In other words, the 
results should be strictly interpreted for the sectors included and not to be generalized.   
 
2.2  Evidence of the Intra-regional Integration 
This section will be reviewing some of the literature evaluating the regional trade agreements 
that help build the second pillar of economic integration in the region, namely the South-South 
level. The main agreements implemented among the SMCs and MENA in general are the 
PAFTA and the Agadir Agreement. It is worth mentioning that some of the following papers also 
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report evidence relevant to the first pillar discussed in the previous section. Table 2.2 
summarizes the papers discussed in this section.  
 
Table 2.2: Intra-regional integration (South-South pillar) 
Author(s) Sample Methodology Findings 
Abedini and 
Peridy (2008) 
15 members of 
the PAFTA, 6 
potential Arab 
members plus 35 
reference 
countries over the 
1988-2005 period 
Gravity model based on the 
theoretical foundation of 
Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2001) estimated using fixed-
effects, Hausman-Taylor, and 
GMM estimators allowing for: 
- persistence of trade flows 
(lagged values regressors) 
- multilateral trade resistance 
(exporters & importers fixed-
effects) 
- time-varying component of 
multilateral resistance (proxied by 
a composite index of trade 
openness) 
- proxies for the development of 
information infrastructure at the 
bilateral level and the quality of 
law and contract enforcement at 
the country level 
An increase of intra-Arab 
trade flows of 16% to 24% can 
be attributed to the PAFTA, 
depending on the estimation 
methods 
CASE report 
(2009) 
Trade data for 
100 countries 
over the 1970-
2008 period 
A gravity-based joint estimation of 
the trade effects of the intra-
regional TAs in the Mediterranean 
region (PAFTA & Agadir 
agreements) and of the EU-Med 
agreements including country-pair 
fixed-effects to reduce omitted 
variables risk due to unobserved 
pair-wise characteristics. 
PAFTA: a coefficient of 0.76, 
indicating that trade between 
members of this agreement 
more than doubled in average 
(an increase of 113%) 
Agadir Agreement: no 
significant trade creation 
effect among its members and 
increase of members‟ exports 
to non-member countries 
 
Abedini and Peridy (2008) provide one of the earliest ex-post evaluations of the PAFTA using a 
sample of 56 countries from 1988 to 2005. They use various estimation techniques for robustness 
such as transformed fixed-effects, Hausman-Taylor estimator as well as dynamic GMM. They 
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also include dummies for other RTAs implemented among the sampled countries one of which is 
of particular interest, namely the Euro-Med AAs. All of their trials report consistent results 
regarding the impact of the both PAFTA and the AAs. Implementing the PAFTA increased the 
exports of the member countries (positive and statistically significant coefficients in all trials). 
As for the impact of the Euro-Med agreements, the estimated coefficients are all statistically 
insignificant with a value close to zero (positive and negative), which reflects the insignificant 
impact the AAs have on the exports for the signatories.  
The CASE report (2009) follows the methodology used by Ruiz and Villarubia (2007) 
comparing 100 countries of largest exports in 2004 over the period from 1970 to 2008. Apart 
from studying the impact of the Euro-Med agreements on the partners, it also studies the effects 
on the individual Mediterranean countries individually as the depth and length of the integration 
process differs across countries. It also investigates the impact of the PAFTA and Agadir 
Agreement on the trade flow. It also employs a more robust estimation technique by including 
pair dummies to reduce the omitted variables bias from unobserved pair-wise characteristics. It 
also includes three dummies for each FTA to capture the effects of these FTAs on both trade 
creation outside the FTAs and trade diversion from outside the FTAs in addition to the standard 
investigation of the FTAs impact on trade creation inside the FTAs. As for the results, the study 
finds no support for the hypothesis that signing the AAs had contributed in increasing the trade 
flow between the parties involved since the coefficient of the variable was statistically 
insignificant and close to zero (-0.005). As for the PAFTA, it had a significant effect on the trade 
flow between its members (coefficient 0.759). Similar to the AAs, signing the Agadir Agreement 
had no significant effect on trade among its signatories (coefficient -0.035 and statistically 
insignificant). Yet these last results should be treated with caution, since the sample includes 
only two post-implementation years. It could have been simply too early to judge. This is the 
same reason that could explain the results related with the impact of signing the AAs on the 
individual Mediterranean countries. Only Egypt and Tunisia report positive and statistically 
significant results for signing the AAs (0.74 and 0.28 respectively). As for Algeria, signing the 
AA seems to have a negative impact on its exports (-0.3). As for Morocco, Jordan and Israel, the 
coefficients of the AAs were statistically insignificant.  
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After discussing the literature evaluating the impact of the regional trade agreements of interest, 
a general remark should be made: A general limitation of the use of gravity models as described 
above means that the results reflect the gross impact of the RTAs on trade flows between the 
signatories due to the neglect of the actual level of protection prior to and during the 
implementation of the agreement and its coverage in terms of products, and the exceptions at the 
product and sector level and also the time schedule of tariff reductions. Also these results should 
be strictly interpreted over the covered time periods and cannot be generalized.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1  Data Sources and Equation 
This section is devoted to describing the data and equation used in the empirical analysis. The 
empirical strategy in this paper follows the approach started by Anderson and Wincoop (2001) 
augmenting the gravity equation with a multilateral trade resistance term in order to obtain a 
specification for the gravity equation that can be considered as a reduced form of a model for 
trade with microfoundation. This study is based on a panel composed of 14 countries (5 EU-
members, 7 Non-EU Mediterranean countries in addition to USA and Japan)
6
 for the period from 
1991 till 2012. As for the sources, data for the bilateral trade flow (exports) are from the United 
Nations COMTRADE database, GDP of both reporter and partner countries are from the World 
Bank database, dates of the enforcement of the different RTAs and other bilateral agreements 
between the sampled countries are from the World Trade Organization trade agreements 
database and finally variables controlling for pair-specific characteristics i.e. distance are from 
the CEPII database.  
As will be described later in details, the empirical analysis investigates the impact of the various 
regional trade agreements in the Euro-Med region from four perspectives: First, it estimates the 
impact of the trade agreements (PAFTA, AGADIR and AAs) on the trade flow (i.e. exports) 
between the sampled countries. Second, it estimates the impact of these trade agreements on the 
exports of SMCs to the rest of the sampled countries. Third, it estimates the impact of the AAs 
on the exports of the EU countries to the SMCs. Finally, it identifies the impact of the trade 
agreements on the exports of the different SMCs individually.  The estimated gravity equations 
in these trials are all derived from the following equation depending on the best specification for 
each trial: 
                                                          
6
 The countries included in the sample are: Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (EU-
countries), Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey (non-EU Mediterranean countries 
conveniently called SMCs i.e. South Mediterranean Countries) in addition to USA and Japan as controls for trade 
with the rest of the world.  
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𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽4  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
+  𝛽6 𝑤𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝑝𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽8  𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽9  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡  +  𝛽10  𝑏𝑖𝑙_𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡  
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                                                                  (1) 
where: 
i) lexp is the natural logarithm of the exports in USD from country i = reporter to 
country j = partner,  
ii) lmass is the natural logarithm of the product of the GDPs in USD of both reporter 
and partner, 
iii) ldist is the natural logarithm of the simple distance between the most populated 
cities in both reporter and partner countries,  
iv) contig is a dummy taking 1 for contiguity 0 otherwise, 
v) comlang_off  a dummy taking 1 for reporter and partner countries sharing an 
official or primary language 0 otherwise,  
vi) colony a dummy taking 1 if reporter and partner countries were ever in a colonial 
relationship 0 otherwise,  
vii) wto a dummy taking 1 if both reporter and partner countries are members of the 
World Trade Organization 0 otherwise,   
viii) pafta a dummy taking 1 if both reporter and partner countries are members of the 
Pan Arab Free Trade Area 0 otherwise,  
ix) agadir a dummy taking 1 if both reporter and partner countries signed the Agadir 
Agreement 0 otherwise,  
x) aa a dummy taking 1 if both reporter and partner countries signed an Association 
Agreement 0 otherwise,   
xi) bil_agr a dummy taking 1 if reporter and partner countries signed a bilateral 
agreement 0 otherwise.  
The variables contig, comlang_off and colony serve as proxies for the multilateral trade 
resistance term and are taken from the CEPII database as well as the distance variable. The 
dummies for the various trade agreements (pafta, agadir, aa and bil_agr) are constructed based 
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on the dates of enforcement registered in the WTO agreements database as well as the WTO 
membership dummy wto.
7
  
In general, the variables can be categorized into three main categories: (1) Standard Gravity 
Variables:  Distance and Mass, (2) Other controls: Contiguity, common language and colonial 
relationship as proxies for the multilateral trade resistance term as well as the WTO membership 
for controls and finally (3) Trade Agreements: PAFTA, AGADIR, AA and other bilateral 
agreements.  It is expected that bilateral exports are negatively influenced by the distance but 
positively influenced by the mass, contiguity, common language, colonial history and the WTO 
membership. As for the priori on the impact of the RTAs, the literature reports contradicting 
results for the PAFTA, Agadir Agreement as well as the AAs (positive, negative as well as non-
significance). The other bilateral agreements are expected to have a positive influence on the 
exports.  
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy  
Moving to the estimation technique and reporting of the results, the study peruses the same 
methodology for all trials despite the differences in the specifications of the gravity equations 
used for the different purposes. Since the empirical analysis is based on a panel data technique, 
estimating the gravity equation using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) yields results that suffer 
from heterogeneity bias. The most widely used techniques controlling for heterogeneity are the 
Random Effects Model (REM) and Fixed Effects Model (FEM). The REM yields more efficient 
estimates if the orthogonality conditions hold: unobserved bilateral effects are ~n.i.i.d and 
orthogonal to the remaining part of the error term. In other words, regressors have to be 
uncorrelated with individual effects and error term for all cross sections and time periods. If the 
orthogonality conditions are violated, FEM yield consistent estimates.  A Hausman Specification 
Test is then conducted to test the presence of correlation between explanatory variables and 
individual effects with the null hypothesis of zero correlation. For all trials tables of results report 
both FEM and REM estimates in addition to the Hausman Specification Test statistics. In some 
of the trials the orthogonality conditions are violated, hence, a FEM is preferred. But a major 
                                                          
7
 Tables with the exact dates for those variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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drawback of FEMs is the inability to provide estimates for time-invariant variables, such as 
distance, common language, contiguity and colonial history. To overcome this problem, the 
results of the Hausman Taylor Estimator (HT) are also reported. The HT is a 2SLS random 
effects model that allows the parameter estimation of time-invariant variables despite the 
presence of correlation between explanatory variables and individual effects. Finally, to deal 
with the non-stationarity problem of the macroeconomic variables used in the gravity equations 
(Exports and GDPs), more robust results to I(1) variables using an Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) specification following Pesaran et al. (2001) are reported in the Appendix. In 
general the results of the ARDL approach don‟t contradict the findings of the baseline models 
reported in the body of the research in terms of the significance of the different trade 
agreements.
8
 
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
The section is devoted to the elaboration of the empirical analysis conducted and the 
interpretation of the results. As mentioned earlier, the study investigates the impact of the various 
trade agreements relevant to the region in terms of their impact on the exports of the sampled 
countries in general, then focusing on the exports of the SMCs, the exports of the EU countries 
and finally the impact on the exports of each individual SMC. 
 
3.3.1 The Impact of the Trade Agreements on the Full Sample 
The first trial of the empirical analysis aims at identifying the impact of the various trade 
agreements enforced in the region. As mentioned before, the economic integration process in the 
region is built on two main pillars: Intra- and Interregional integration. A Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Area can only be effective if economic integration is achieved both among the SMCs 
themselves, i.e. South-South economic integration as well as between the EU from one side and 
the SMCs from the other, i.e. North-South economic integration. As far as the South-South level 
                                                          
8
 Robustness tests using sub-samples for all estimation techniques (FE, RE, HT and ARDL) are provided in the 
Appendix.  
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or the intra-regional level is concerned, there are two main agreements of interest: The Pan-Arab 
Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA) in force since 1998 between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia and since 2008 by Algeria. It aimed at creating a free trade area between the Arab states 
among which are the South Mediterranean countries of interest. The other important agreement 
is the Agadir Agreement enforced in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia since 2007. As for the 
North-South or inter-regional level, the main agreement is the Association Agreements (AAs) 
signed between the EU and the SMCs individually but in a manner that allows the construction 
of a grid of bilateral agreements that lead to an overall integrated region. The AAs cover Algeria 
(2005), Egypt (2004), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002), Morocco (2000) and Tunisia (1998). The 
Custom Union with Turkey (1996) is included here among the North-South agreements since 
Turkey is historically considered the portal between Europe and the Middle East in general. And 
achieving a high level of economic integration between Turkey and Europe form one side and 
between Turkey and the rest of the Mediterranean countries form the other, can play a major role 
in achieving overall regional economic integration. Therefore, other bilateral agreements 
between the countries of the sample are included to capture further efforts of economic 
integration.  Those agreements are between Turkey and Egypt (2007), Turkey and Israel (1997), 
Turkey and Jordan (2011), Turkey and Morocco (2006), Turkey and Tunisia (2005) as well as 
extra-regional bilateral agreements between USA and Israel (1985), USA and Jordan (2001) and 
finally between USA and Morocco (2006). 
Moving to the estimated gravity equation, as mentioned before, equation (1) represents the full 
model specification from which the actual estimated equations in all trial are derived based on 
the best specification results. In the current trial with the full sample the variables contig, colony 
and wto were dropped for insignificance. The estimation results are shown in Table 3.1 (Panel A) 
for fixed effects (Column 1), random effects (Column 2) and finally for the Hausman-Taylor 
Estimator (Column 3). 
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Table 3.1: Estimation results (1991 – 2012) 
Dependent 
Variable 
lexp 
Full Sample 
(A) 
SMCs Sample 
(B) 
EU Sample 
(C) 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
lmass .625 *** .668*** .624 *** .696*** .721*** .701*** .601*** .604*** .601*** 
ldist (omitted) -.700*** -.456*** (omitted) -1.067*** -2.593** (omitted) -.374** -.335 
contig    (omitted) -1.222** -1.858***    
comlang_off (omitted) -.006 -.834* (omitted) .788*** .3707 (omitted) .741* -2.527 
pafta .297*** .226*** .298*** .201   ** .154** .187***    
agadir .451*** .396*** .452*** .363*** .328*** .353***    
aa .014 -.035 .017 -.065 -.084 -.067 .035* .033 .035* 
bil_agr .569*** .510*** .572*** .540*** .517*** .545***    
constant -12.874*** -9.673*** -9.123*** -17.111*** -10.343*** -2.952*** -11.150*** -8.384*** -8.333*** 
Overall R
2
 0.70 0.80  0.49 0.67  0.79 0.83  
Hausman Chi
2
 Test 81.38***(FE)  6.49 (RE)  N/A  
Sargan-Hansen Test P-value(Chi-sq) = 0.698 P-value(Chi-sq) = 0.014 P-value(Chi-sq) = 0.000 
No. of observations 3845 1863 976 
No. of groups 179 88 45 
    Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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As shown in Table 3.1, columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results with fixed effects and 
random effects respectively. The Hausman Specification Test is conducted to choose the best 
model for that specification. As reported in Table 3.1 the null hypothesis is rejected, which 
recommend the use of fixed effects. Accordingly, results show that that both PAFTA and 
AGADIR are significant at 1% with coefficients 0.29 and 0.45 respectively. This indicates the 
relative effectiveness of the Agadir Agreement compared to the PAFTA. As for the Association 
Agreements, the estimated coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant indicating that 
signing the AAs didn‟t play a significant role in affecting the exports of the sampled countries. 
This result is already reported in previous literature as stated before.  
Finally, other bilateral agreements variable has a positive coefficient of 0.56 significant at 1%. 
Moreover, the mass variable is positive and significant as expected. One drawback of the FEM is 
that time-invariant variables, in this case distance and common language, can‟t be estimated. 
Therefore, a HT estimator is used to estimate those variables. As expected the distance has a 
negative and significant coefficient, but the common language has a negative coefficient but 
weakly significant only at 10%. This result is unexpected. To verify the validity of the 
instruments used in the HT estimation the Sargan-Hansen test, a test for overidentifying 
restriction, is conducted. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. According to the p-value of the test statistic in Table 3.1, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which validates the instruments used.  
 
3.3.2 The Impact of the Trade Agreements on the South Mediterranean Countries 
I will move now to the trial that investigates the impact of the different trade agreements on the 
exports of the SMCs in specific. Equation (1) shows the estimated gravity model after dropping 
the variables colony and wto for insignificance in all specifications trials. Worth mentioning is 
that the SMCS sample represents the bilateral trade between SMCs as reporters to EU, other 
SMCs, Japan and USA. It captures the SMCs exports among each other (South-South 
integration) as well as to EU countries (North-South integration). 
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Table 3.1 (Panel B) shows the estimation results for both the fixed effects and random effects 
models in columns (1) and (2). The null hypothesis of the Hausman Specification Test is not 
rejected, which recommends the use of a REM.  The coefficient estimates for mass and distance 
are significant at 1% and have the expected signs. As for the control variables contiguity and 
common language, both are significant at 5% and 1% respectively. Contiguity has a negative 
impact on exports which is contradicting to the priori but in line with some results reported in the 
literature (Abedini and Peridy, 2008). Whereas sharing a common official or primary language 
has a positive impact on the reporters‟ exports. As for the trade agreements, both PAFTA and 
Agadir Agreement have positive and significant coefficients 0.15 (at 5%) and 0.32 (at 1%) 
respectively. These results coincide with the ones reported for the full sample. As for the AAs, 
the estimated coefficient has a negative sign but is statistically insignificant. This is also 
supported in some of the previous studies. Finally, other bilateral agreements are significant at 
1% and have a positive impact on exports. Column (3) shows the coefficients estimates from the 
HT, which are relatively identical to the results of the REM discussed except for the insignificant 
coefficient of the common language variable.  
 
3.3.3 The Impact of the Association Agreements on the EU countries 
The following trial investigates the impact of the AAs on the EU countries in specific. Together 
with the results reported in section (3.2.2), a better judgment about the extent of the North-South 
integration can be reached. Equation (1) represents the estimated gravity model for that purpose 
after dropping the variables comlang_off, colony and wto for insignificance in all specifications 
trials. Worth mentioning is that the EU sample represents the bilateral trade between EU 
countries as reporters and SMCs, Japan and USA as partner countries. In that context, only the 
AAs as regional trade agreements are relevant.  
Table 3.1 (Panel C) reports the estimation results using fixed effects, random effects and HT 
models. According to all models the coefficient of the AAs are always positive (0.03) and 
significant at 10% in both the FE and HT models. That result implies that signing the AAs had 
an asymmetric effect on the signing states. That positive impact on the EU exports combined 
with the insignificance of the AAs in the SMCs sample, indicate a deficiency in the economic 
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integration process. Explanations for the biasness in benefits gained from the AAs can range 
from asymmetric design of the AAs to more complex problems such as the absence of any 
further gains possible to the SMCs from trading with the EU.  
 
3.3.4 The Impact of the Trade Agreements on the Exports of the different SMCs 
individually 
This section takes a closer look at the country-specific impact of the different agreements. The 
focus is only on SMCs to further explain the results of AAs insignificance reported in section 
(3.2.2). The analysis is based on the same specification used for the SMCs sample in section 
(3.2.2). Table 3.2 reports the estimation results for PAFTA, Agadir Agreement, AA and the other 
bilateral agreements. Furthermore, for each agreement, the results from FE, RE and HT are 
always reported.  
 
Table 3.2: Estimation results for the SM country-specific sample (1991 - 2012) 
Reporter 
PAFTA AGADIR 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
Algeria
9
 -.004 -.001 .030    
Egypt
10
 .524*** .526 *** .511*** 1.378 *** 1.380*** 1.365*** 
Israel
11
       
Jordan
12
 .068 .052 -.007 .133 .134 .072 
Morocco .520*** .298** .513*** .453*** .273* .447*** 
Tunisia -.228* -.246 * -.231* -.028 -.037 -.027 
Turkey       
 
                                                          
9
 The test of overidentifying restrictions couldn‟t be computed for the full model (1991 – 2012) but was successfully 
conducted verifying the choice of the instruments for the sub-sample (1996 – 2010). Therefore, the reported results 
are relatively robust.  
10
 Same as the footnote above 
11
 Same as the footnote above 
12
 Same as the  footnote above 
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Table 3.2: Estimation results for the SM country-specific sample (1991 - 2012) (Continue) 
Reporter 
AA BIL_AGR 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(1) 
RE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
Algeria -.463** -.465* -.448*    
Egypt .501*** .508*** .496*** 1.242*** 1.228*** 1.184*** 
Israel -.172 -.177 -.164 .167 .184 .132 
Jordan -.778*** -.783*** -.847*** 1.762 1.836*** 1.771*** 
Morocco .339*** .223** .336*** .550*** .311* .532*** 
Tunisia -.021 -.016 -.004 -.273 -.287 -.278 
Turkey .272*** .276*** .275*** .471*** .470*** .466*** 
Note: *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
In the case of Algeria, the only relevant agreements are the PAFTA and AA. Whereas, the 
PAFTA had no significant impact on the Algerian exports, the AAs had a negative impact.  As 
for Egypt all agreements are relevant, have statistically significant and positive coefficients. 
Since Israel, for historical and political reasons, is the least integrated state with the rest of the 
SMCs, only the AAs and the other bilateral agreements are relevant, but both are statistically 
insignificant. Moving to Jordan, where all agreements are relevant, only the AA and the other 
bilateral agreements are significant. But, where as the other bilateral agreements had a positive 
impact on the Jordanian exports, signing the AA had a negative impact. Same as Egypt, Morocco 
reports significant and positive coefficients for all agreements of interest. In contrast, Tunisia 
reports insignificant results for all agreements except PAFTA that has a significant but negative 
coefficient. Finally, Turkey reports positive and significant coefficients for the AA as well as the 
other bilateral agreements, which basically reflects its ties with the rest of the SMCs. This 
emphasizes the importance of Turkey as an integration hub between the EU and the Middle 
Eastern South Mediterranean countries. 
To summarize, the empirical analysis in this paper shows that on the South-South pillar of the 
economic integration process in the region, implementing the PAFTA has a positive effect on the 
exports of the sampled countries in general. This result is consistent with previous findings such 
as Abedini and Peridy (2008) and the CASE report (2009). When focusing on the exports of 
SMCs, signing the PAFTA also has a positive impact on the exports of the signatories from the 
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South Mediterranean MENA countries in general. As for the impact on the exports of particular 
SMCs, it seems like only Egypt and Morocco are the countries reporting positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. Moving to the second RTA of interest on the South-South integration 
level, the Agadir Agreement, results show a positive impact of singing the agreement on the 
whole sample. Also the results from the SMCs sample support that positive impact. But that 
positive effect seems to be affecting only Egypt and Morocco, whereas Jordan and Tunisia report 
insignificant coefficients. These results are not in line with the findings of earlier works, which 
report an insignificant impact of the Agadir Agreement on the trade flow of its signatories. But, 
as mentioned earlier while discussing those previous works, this insignificant impact has to be 
treated with caution due to the short ex-implementation time covered in those works. This is not 
the case here. Therefore, one can safely support the hypothesis of the positive impact also of the 
Agadir Agreement.  
Moving to the results from the second pillar for economic integration in the region, the North-
South level, implementing the AAs doesn‟t have any significant impact on the exports of the 
whole sample. These results are in line with previous findings such as Ruiz and Villarubia (2007) 
and Hagemejer and Ciselik (2009). This insignificant impact is also reported when focusing on 
the exports of SMCs in general, whereas a positive and significant impact of signing the AAs is 
reported for the exports of the EU countries. As for the impact of signing the AAs on the 
particular SMCs, results show an increase in exports of Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, a decrease 
in exports for Algeria and Jordan and finally an insignificant impact on the exports of Morocco 
and Israel. The results for Egypt, Algeria and Israel are consistent with those of the CASE report 
(2009). But it contradicts with what it reports about Morocco and Tunisia. According to its 
sample that covers till 2008, there was no significant impact on the exports of both Morocco and 
Jordan, whereas the sample used in this paper covers till 2012 and reports significant and 
positive impact for Morocco and a negative impact on the Jordanian exports. As for Tunisia, the 
CASE report (2009) shows a positive and significant impact on the exports of Tunisia, whereas 
here the coefficient for the AA in the case of Tunisia is negative and statistically insignificant.  
In other words, the empirical findings of this paper can be considered as warning signs regarding 
the effectiveness of the Euro-Med integration process. The main goal of the Euro-Med process, 
on the economic integration level is to liberalize the flow of trade and create a region of shared 
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economic prosperity. This should be achieved by boasting the level of trade between both shores 
of the Mediterranean by implementing a grid of bilateral Association Agreements between the 
EU and the SMCs. This should be complemented by EU-sponsored South-South bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements among the SMCs. The assessment of the effectiveness of those 
efforts reported in this paper; show a major failure on the inter-regional level and more 
promising results on the intra-regional level. The failure on the inter-regional level is not only a 
failure of boasting the flow of exports from the less developed SMCs to the European markets, 
but also a failure in creating balanced benefits for the signatories. The positive impact of the AAs 
on the exports of the EU countries, although relatively small, reflects asymmetries in the design 
of the AAs. This inefficient design of the AAs led to a one-directional flow of benefits across the 
Mediterranean. And unfortunately, the benefits are extracted from the less developed and more 
in need side of the Mediterranean.   
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CONCLUSION AND SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper provides an ex-post assessment of the Euro-Med Association Agreements signed 
between the EU and some SMCs. The AAs serve as a key building block in the Euro-
Mediterranean integration process, launched in the mid 90s by the Barcelona Process. These 
agreements should boast the flow of trade between both shores of the Mediterranean 
complemented by the presence of other regional trade agreements that liberalize the trade 
between the southern Mediterranean states themselves. The empirical analysis in this paper is 
based on a gravity model setting estimated using various techniques for robustness. Fixed 
effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators are reported for the gravity equations 
estimated for the panel of 14 countries (7 Non-EU Mediterranean countries, 5 EU members in 
addition to control countries USA and Japan) for the period from 1991 to 2012. To investigate 
thoroughly the impact of the agreements of interest from the perspective of all signatories, four 
different specifications of the gravity equation are estimated:  
I. Estimating the impact of the trade agreements (PAFTA, AGADIR and AAs) on the trade 
flow (i.e. exports) between the sampled countries.  
II. Estimating the impact of these trade agreements on the exports of SMCs to the rest of the 
sampled countries.  
III. Estimating the impact of the AAs on the exports of the EU countries to the SMCs. 
IV. Estimating the impact of the trade agreements on the exports of the different SMCs 
individually.   
Results show positive impact for signing both the PAFTA and the Agadir Agreement on the 
sample as a whole and also on the exports of the SMCs in specific. This implies a success for the 
intra-regional economic integration process, which is actually the complementary pillar of the 
Barcelona Process. The main pillar is the inter-regional economic integration, which is evaluated 
here by assessing the impact of the AAs on the trade flow. Here, the results are less promising. 
Signing the AAs has no significant impact on the exports of the sampled countries in general as 
well as on the exports of the SMCs on average. However, signing the AAs seems to benefit the 
EU countries. A positive and significant coefficient is reported for the AAs in the sample 
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focusing on the exports of the EU to the SMCs. This implies a bias in the outcome of the first 
pillar. The AAs did succeed in boasting the level of trade between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean, but only in one direction. Hence, the objective of creating a region of “shared 
economic prosperity” seems to be not achieved. An asymmetric distribution of benefits among 
the signatories of the AAs is evident. The general outcome so far recommends a deeper 
investigation into the design of the AAs that led to the one-sided benefits. This is especially 
important since the beneficiaries in this case are the more developed countries. The Barcelona 
Process intended to create a free trade area that can contribute in creating a region of shared 
prosperity and wealth. In that sense, the Barcelona Process didn‟t succeed in lifting up the less 
developed states of the Mediterranean, but on the contrary it only opened up their markets for the 
European goods. On a lighter note, tracing the impact of these agreements on the exports of the 
individual SMCs seems to be providing some promising leads. The results reported in this paper 
for the impact of signing the PAFTA, the Agadir Agreement as well as the AAs, show that both 
Egypt and Morocco have always benefited from those RTAs. In other words, despite the general 
insignificant impact of the AAs on the exports of the SMCs, in the country-specific results both 
Egypt and Morocco report positive a significant coefficients. Same is reported for the 
coefficients of the PAFTA and Agadir Agreement. These positive results for Egypt and Morocco 
could be due to external factors such as their macroeconomic environment, a relatively better 
industrial infrastructure compared to the rest o the SMCs or to any other non-trade-policy 
factors. But it could also be due to more efficient trade-related institutional factors that enabled 
both Egypt and Morocco to benefit from trade once joining a RTA.  Future studies focusing on 
trade policies and institutions of Egypt and Morocco and comparing them with their 
counterparties in the rest of the SMCs can lead to beneficial policy recommendations that can 
help the rest of the region benefit from free trade.  
The positive results for Egypt and Morocco can also help in enhancing the design of the AAs. As 
mentioned before not all the signatories of the AAs report positive or significant impact on their 
exports.  The country-specific results show that only Egypt, Morocco and Turkey report positive 
and significant impact for signing the AAs on their exports. The design of the AAs is in general 
identical among the signatories with minor modifications to meet the country-specific needs. A 
comparison between the AAs signed with Egypt, Morocco and Turkey and those signed with 
countries that either didn‟t‟ report any significant impact such as Israel and Tunisia or reported 
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negative impact on their exports such as Algeria and Jordan, can be beneficial.  Matching the 
terms of the AA with the country-specific characteristics and comparing those for the different 
countries relevant to their successfulness can lead to ideas of how to improve the overall design 
of the agreements.  
The Euro-Mediterranean process is an ambitious project which makes it more difficult to reach 
satisfactory outcomes easily. The geopolitical nature of the East and South Mediterranean 
countries, especially in the past few years, puts it in the center of events that have major global 
impacts. The political instability and on-going wars create new obstacle on the road for stability 
and prosperity, not only for the affected countries but also for their neighbors. This fact has been 
well-known to their European neighbors. The multidimensional nature of the Barcelona Process 
and its offspring, the Union for the Mediterranean, makes it the perfect institution capable of 
dealing with this matter. Achieving deeper integration in the region is the answer to all the 
problems. Moving form trade agreements to a fully-fledged economically integrated region 
supported by cooperation on political, cultural, social and humanitarian levels is the ambitious 
but not impossible goal to be achieved here.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
No. of 
Observation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
lexp 3868 20.57657 2.56837 8.294049 25.71502 
lmass 3845 53.40233 2.826829 45.48612 59.83483 
ldist 3868 7.855311 0.948918 4.710371 9.353102 
contig 3868 0.059979 0.237479 0 1 
comlang_off 3868 0.167011 0.373034 0 1 
colony 3868 0.094881 0.293089 0 1 
wto 3868 0.679679 0.46666 0 1 
pafta 3868 0.055843 0.229648 0 1 
agadir 3868 0.017839 0.132382 0 1 
aa 3868 0.219752 0.414132 0 1 
bil_agr 3868 0.038004 0.191231 0 1 
 
 
Table A2: Other Bilateral Agreements implemented in the region 
In Force since Egypt Israel Jordon Morocco Tunisia Turkey USA 
Egypt 
     
2007 
 
Israel 
     
1997 1985 
Jordon 
     
2011 2001 
Morocco 
     
2006 2006 
Tunisia 
     
2005 
 
Turkey 2007 1997 2011 2006 2005 
  
USA 
 
1985 2001 2006 
   
Source: Based on the WTO database 
 
Table A3: The Agadir Agreement 
In Force since Egypt Jordon Morocco Tunisia 
Egypt 
 
2007 2007 2007 
Jordon 2007 
 
2007 2007 
Morocco 2007 2007 
 
2007 
Tunisia 2007 2007 2007 
 
Source: Based on the WTO database 
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Table A4: The Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement 
In Force since Date 
Algeria 2008 
Egypt 1998 
Jordon 1998 
Morocco 1998 
Tunisia 1998 
Source: Based on the WTO database 
 
Table A5:  WTO membership 
Member  Date Member  Date 
Algeria observer  government Jordon 11 April 2000 
Egypt 30 June 1995 Morocco 1 January 1995 
France 1 January 1995 Netherlands 1 January 1995 
Germany 1 January 1995 Tunisia 29 March 1995 
Israel 21 April 1995 Turkey 26 March 1995 
Italy 1 January 1995 United Kingdom 1 January 1995 
Japan 1 January 1995 USA 1 January 1995 
Source: Based on the WTO database 
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Table A6: The EU Association Agreements 
In Force since Algeria Egypt France Germany Israel Italy Jordon Morocco Netherlands Tunisia Turkey United Kingdom 
Algeria 
  
2005 2005 
 
2005 
  
2005 
  
2005 
Egypt 
  
2004 2004 
 
2004 
  
2004 
  
2004 
France 2005 2004 
  
2000 
 
2002 2000 
 
1998 1996 
 
Germany 2005 2004 
  
2000 
 
2002 2000 
 
1998 1996 
 
Israel 
  
2000 2000 
 
2000 
  
2000 
  
2000 
Italy 2005 2004 
  
2000 
 
2002 2000 
 
1998 1996 
 
Jordon 
  
2002 2002 
 
2002 
  
2002 
  
2002 
Morocco 
  
2000 2000 
 
2000 
  
2000 
  
2000 
Netherlands 2005 2004 
  
2000 
 
2002 2000 
 
1998 1996 
 
Tunisia 
  
1998 1998 
 
1998 
  
1998 
  
1998 
Turkey  
(CU not AA)   
1996 1996 
 
1996 
  
1996 
  
1996 
United Kingdom 2005 2004 
  
2000 
 
2002 2000 
 
1998 1996 
 
Source: Based on the WTO database 
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Robustness Tests: I. Sub-sample (1996 – 2010) 
Table A7: Full Sample 
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Hausman-Taylor  
Estimation 
lmass .632*** .691*** .630*** 
ldist (omitted) -.732*** -.555*** 
comlang_off (omitted) -.022 -.978***  
pafta .437*** .342*** .433 *** 
agadir .532*** .457*** .532*** 
aa .005 -.042 .009 
bil_agr .452*** .403*** .457*** 
constant -13.246*** -10.659*** -8.666*** 
Overall R-square 0.69 0.80 Sargan-Hansen Test 
Hausman Chi-sq Test 64.14*** (FE) P-value(Chi-sq) =0.5891 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table A8: SMCs Sample: 
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Hausman-Taylor 
Estimation 
lmass .703*** .742*** .711*** 
ldist (omitted) -1.134*** -2.372** 
contig (omitted) -1.326* -1.714*** 
comlang_off (omitted) .727** .270 
pafta .361*** .288*** .335*** 
agadir .447*** .394*** .433*** 
aa -.054 -.070 -.053    
bil_agr .428 *** .414*** .436*** 
constant -17.548*** -10.933*** -4.610 
Overall R-square 0.47 0.67 Sargan-Hansen Test 
Hausman Chi-sp Test 70.62*** (FE) P-value(Chi-sq) = 0.0159 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table A9: EU Sample: 
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Fixed Effects Random Effects Hausman-Taylor Estimation 
lmass .577 *** .583*** .577*** 
ldist (omitted) -.315* -.239 
comlang_off (omitted) .765* -2.677 
aa .050* .046 * .050* 
constant -9.858*** -7.751*** -7.795*** 
Overall R-square 0.79 0.83 Sargan-Hansen Test 
Hausman Chi-sq Test 0.51 (RE) P-value (Chi-sq)= 0.000  
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table A10: SM country-specific sample: 
Reporter PAFTA AGADIR 
FE RE HT FE RE HT 
Algeria .279    .258    .321 N/A N/A N/A 
Egypt .533 ** .575** .523* 1.046*** 1.097781*** 1.041994*** 
Israel N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Jordan .099  .012  -.014 .369*  .3506357* .3236679 
Morocco .443*** .154  .433*** .297* .1198855  .2891344* 
Tunisia .037 .016    .032    -.077    -.0755819    -.0660408    
Turkey N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Reporter AA BIL_AGR 
FE RE HT FE RE HT 
Algeria -.218 -.243    -.204    N/A N/A N/A 
Egypt .259   .297 * .260 .259   .397 .321 
Israel -.052    -.057    -.040   -.085   -.085 -.201  
Jordan -.451 *** -.474*** -.496*** 2.719 *** 2.726*** 2.706*** 
Morocco .109  .071   .111  .280  .070 .257 
Tunisia -.122 -.086      -.077    -.314 -.304   -.297 
Turkey (omitted) .231    .226 .315*** .315*** .312*** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Robustness Tests: II. ARDL Fixed Effects Specification 
 
Table A11: Full Sample  
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Model 
1991 – 2012 
Sub-sample 
1996 – 2010 
lmass .753*** .758*** 
ldist (omitted) (omitted) 
comlang_off (omitted) (omitted) 
pafta .279*** .287*** 
agadir .225*** .285*** 
aa .028 .033   
bil_agr .208*** .183*** 
constant -4.869*** -4.994*** 
Overall R-square 0.95 0.94 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table A12: SMCs Sample: 
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Model 
1991 – 2012 
Sub-sample 
1996 – 2010 
lmass .835*** .821*** 
ldist (omitted) (omitted) 
contig (omitted) (omitted) 
comlang_off (omitted) (omitted) 
pafta .239*** .239*** 
agadir .190*** .246*** 
aa .010    .005 
bil_agr .170** .1465* 
constant -7.351*** -8.611*** 
Overall R-square 0.89 0.86 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table A13: EU Sample 
Dependent Variable 
lexp 
Model 
1991 – 2012 
Sub-sample 
1996 – 2010 
lmass .666*** .678*** 
ldist (omitted) (omitted) 
comlang_off (omitted) (omitted) 
aa .038* .053*** 
constant -2.925*** -1.913** 
Overall R-square 0.97 0.97 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table A14: SM Country-specific Samples 
Reporter Model 
1991 – 2012 
 PAFTA AGADIR AA BIL_AGR 
Algeria .1952255    N/A -.163547 N/A 
Egypt .4493641*** .3028624* .1124373    .2337547  
Israel N/A N/A -.0650882 -.1188911 
Jordan -.0889571 .3608161*** (omitted) .7040752*** 
Morocco .1911707 -.0147062 -.1203349 .1006295 
Tunisia -.0831038 -.1167351 -.1366495 -.2696758 
Turkey N/A N/A (omitted) (omitted) 
 
Reporter Sub-sample 
1996 – 2010 
 PAFTA AGADIR AA BIL_AGR 
Algeria .1869475 N/A -.1304037 N/A 
Egypt .4665237** .3704879* .1307143 .2007136 
Israel N/A N/A -.0303421 -.1417163 
Jordan -.061748 .4116757*** (omitted) (omitted) 
Morocco .1395266 .0518165 -.1028013 .0751228 
Tunisia -.1426527 -.0795114 -.2006777* -.2387613 
Turkey N/A N/A (omitted) .1592061*** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
